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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Supreme Court under Article 
VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 58A of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the lower court err in finding that the appraisal of 
Ferrebee's appraiser, Phil Cook, is the best estimate of the 
property's fair market value. 
2. Did Ferrebee sustain his burden of proof in establishing 
a higher and better use of the property. 
3. Did the lower court err in finding that Ferrebee's 
property wa$ entitled to an enhancement value for its proximity to 
the airport. 
4. Did the lower court err in concluding that Ferrebee is 
entitled to an enhancement value because his property is adjoining 
the airport. 
5. Did the lower court err in admitting into evidence that 
portion of Ferrebee's appraiser's report which was based on hearsay 
or otherwise incompetent evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE; 
Tooele County brought this action to condemn property held by 
Ferrebee for use in the completion of the Tooele Valley Airport. 
An Order of Immediate Possession was entered by the lower Court and 
the Ferrebee property was transferred to Tooele County for 
completion of construction. 
Prior to trial, Ferrebee stipulated that the use to which the 
property was being applied is a use authorized by law, that the 
taking is necessary to such use, and that the public use to which 
the property is being applied is a more necessary public use. The 
only issues for trial related to questions of valuation* 
As part of his defense Ferrebee raised the issue of the 
application of the State and Federal Relocation Assistance Act, 
contending that they had been violated. The court indicated 
preliminarily that the Relocation Assistance Acts did not apply, 
but permitted evidence to be put on to alleviate a retrial of the 
case if the decision concerning the Relocation Assistance Act is 
reversed or appealed. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter was tried to the Court in a four day trial 
beginning July 11, 1989. The court entered its Bench Ruling upon 
completion of the trial. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were entered on April 30, 1990. Record 408 (hereafter "R"). A 
copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached as 
an addendum hereto. The final Judgment was entered on June 18, 
1990. R.414. A copy of the final Judgment is attached in the 
addendum. A Notice of Appeal was filed by plaintiff on the 6th day 
of July, 1990 R.419, and a Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed by 
Ferrebee on the 17th day of July, 1990. R.423. 
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C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
At the conclusion of the four day trial, the lower court held 
that the State and Federal Relocation Assistance Acts did not apply 
to this case, and found that Ferrebee's appraisal submitted by J. 
Philip Cook, best represented the fair market value of the 
property. The lower court then awarded damages to Ferrebee based 
on his appraisal in the amount of $74,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
1. In the late 60's and early 70's Tooele County decided to 
develop an airport which would accommodate the landing of larger 
aircraft than could be facilitated by the existing Tooele City 
Airport. R.435, at 10-18. Funding was sought for the project 
through FAA and state grants which were approved in 1974 and 1975. 
R.435, at 18, 27, 29, 80. 
2. An original Airport Lay-out Plan, (hereafter "ALP") was 
developed for the Tooele County Airport which located the airport 
at its present site near Erda. R.435, at 17. 
3. Pursuant to the original ALP, and its various amendments, 
it was determined that aside from the "inholdings", i.e., those 
pieces of property already owned by the County, additional property 
would be required for development of the airport as contemplated by 
the ALP. R.435, at 18. Parcels of property located in Erda were 
acquired by Tooele County for the airport pursuant to negotiation 
or condemnation and construction was begun on the airport in 1975. 
R.435, at 175. 
3 
4. As originally contemplated under the ALP, an 80 acre 
parcel owned by Ferrebee was designated for use in construction of 
the airport. The ALP specifically identified 68 acres of the 
Ferrebee property to be used in the construction of the airport, 
but since the remaining 12 acres constituted a 100' wide strip 
running approximately the length of the airport, it was considered 
to be an uneconomic remainder which had to be acquired by Tooele 
County with the other property. R.435, at 26, 34, 35, 62, 67, 148, 
158, 160, 202, 207-8, 238. 
5. The County filed a condemnation action against Ferrebee 
to condemn 37 acres of his property on May 24, 1979. Only 37 acres 
of the property was taken instead of the full 80 acres because of 
budgetary restraints. R.435, at 123. The verdict awarded damages 
to Ferrebee in the amount of $46,970.00 which included an award of 
$21,070.00 for severance damages to Ferrebee's remaining land. 
R.435, at 271, Exhibit 68. The severance damages were calculated 
at 70% of the value of the remaining 43.66 acres because the taking 
left the property legally land-locked. R.435, at 86. 
6. Shortly after the completion of the condemnation 
proceedings, the County began negotiation with Ferrebee for the 
acquisition of the remaining portion of his property. R.4 35, at 
125. On or about December 3, 1981, the County by and through its 
County Attorney transmitted a copy of an appraisal report prepared 
by Jerry Webber for the 4 3.66 acres that remained of Ferrebee's 
land. R.440, at 824, 825. Mr. Webber's appraisal established the 
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fair market value of the property at $1,750.00 per acre. R.437, at 
348, Exhibit 4. 
7. Ferrebee rejected the Webber appraisal and indicated that 
he was considering gifting the property to the County if the 
property could be valued at or near $10,000.00 per acre for the 
purpose of the gift. R.435, at 180, 302-3, R.440, at 829-30, 
R.435, at 95. Ferrebee requested a follow-up appraisal from his 
appraiser, William L. Allsop. R. 440, at 897, R. 439, at 867. The 
County agreed to pay for the additional appraisal which was 
prepared by Mr. Allsop on December 16, 1981. By a letter dated 
December 29, 1981, the County Attorney, Ron Elton transmitted the 
Allsop appraisal to Ferrebee. R.440, at 830, Exhibit 83. The 
Allsop appraisal assessed the fair market value of the Ferrebee 
property at $4,500.00 per acre, a value the County rejected. 
R.440, at 880, 830, Exhibit 83; R.435, at 200-1. 
8. From 1982 until late 1984, the County continued to 
express interest in the acquisition of the Ferrebee property but 
the County did not have sufficient funds to purchase the property. 
R.435, at 89. 
9. In the original application submitted by the County for 
a federal grant to develop the Tooele Valley Airport, the County 
budgeted the amount necessary for the acquisition of the Ferrebee 
property, based on the Webber $1,750.00 per acre appraisal. R.435, 
at 205. That budget was subsequently amended to reflect changes in 
the appraised value of the property. R.435, at 281. 
5 
10. At the beginning of 1985, the County continued its 
efforts to acquire the Ferrebee property. Because of the changing 
economic conditions of the County, and the time that had passed 
since the prior appraisal in 1981, and because the County was aware 
that the FAA grant would require a current appraisal, the County 
retained Mr. Webber to prepare an updated appraisal of the Ferrebee 
propeOty. R.435, at 101-4. Mr. Webber's updated appraisal for the 
Subject Property which valued the property at $275.00 per acre. 
R.437, at 370, Exhibit 11. 
11. Mr. Webber's appraisal indicated that the reason for the 
drop in value of the property from $1,750.00 per acre to $275.00 
per acre was based on the fact that property prices generally in 
the area had dropped by approximately 50%, and because the property 
was landlocked, an adjustment which had not been made fully before. 
R. 437, at 352-62. 
12. Pursuant to FAA requirements that a review of an 
appraisal be made, and because of the substantial decrease in value 
as evidenced by the $275.00 per acre appraisal, Tooele County 
retained a review appraiser, George Y. Fujii to review and comment 
on the second Webber appraisal. R.435, at 101-5, 205-6. 
13. On June 27, 1985, Mr. Fujii prepared and delivered to 
Tooele County, a letter reviewing the Webber appraisal. R.437, at 
491, Exhibit 15. The County provided a copy of Mr. Fujii's 
critique to Mr. Webber, and requested that Mr. Webber respond. 
R.435, at 105. Mr. Webber responded to Mr. Fujii's critique in 
writing on August 20, 1985. R.437, at 391, Exhibit 13. Based on 
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the response by Mr. Webber, Tooele County was satisfied that the 
Webber appraisal was a fair estimate of the value of the Ferrebee 
property. R.435, at 106. 
14. On February 28, 1986, the County offered to purchase the 
Ferrebee property based upon the Webber $275.00 per acre appraisal, 
or $12,000. R.435, at 119, Exhibit 12. 
15. Again, on March 3, 1986, the County offered to purchase 
the Subject Property for $275.00 per acre and offered an additional 
$200.00 per acre as an incentive to avoid litigation. R.435, at 
109-10. Mr. Ferrebee refused the County's offers. 
16. On May 16, 1986, the County filed its Complaint in this 
action. R.l. At that same time, the County moved for immediate 
occupancy of the property pursuant to statute and deposited with 
the County 75% of the appraised value of the property or $9,004.87. 
Ferrebee stipulated to the County's motion for immediate occupancy. 
R.9-14, 18-22. 
17. At trial, plaintiff offered evidence of the fair market 
value of the property by providing to the court the Webber 
appraisal, and the appraisal of George Y. Fujii. R.437, at 370, 
Exhibit 11; R.438, at 554, Exhibit 17. 
18. Like Mr. Webber, Mr. Fujii determined that the highest 
and best use of the Ferrebee Property was its existing agricultural 
use. R.438, at 554, Exhibit 17. The property is zone A-20 which 
permits only agricultural use with residential development on 20 
acre parcels. _Icl. As long as Ferrebee has owned the property, it 
has been used only for marginal pasture. R.439, at 652-55. 
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19. In determining the properties fair market value, Mr. 
Fujii used the comparable sale approach and analyzed 10 comparable 
sales making adjustments to each sale for differences in zoning, 
location, characteristics, frontage, and soil type. R.439, at 554, 
Exhibit 17, pp. 15-18. Mr. Fujii examined the Ferrebee property 
and found that it could be broken into three different areas based 
on its agricultural use. _Id. , pp. 23-25. Mr. Fujii determined 
that 10 acres was potentially cultivatable land with the remaining 
33.66 acres fit only for use as pasture. Along with the property, 
Ferrebee also owned certain water rights which augmented the value 
of the property. Ferrebee owned 10 acres of undeveloped irrigation 
or well water, and 20 acres of undeveloped drain water. .Ici. Mr. 
Fujii applied the good irrigation water to the 10 acres that had 
cultivation potential and determined that with the water it had a 
value of $1250 per acre. JEci. Mr. Fujii determined that drain 
water did not have the same value as irrigation water, and 
determined that as it would be applied to the remaining 30 acres of 
pasture land, it would increase the value of that land only by 
$100.00 per acre, including the water. Jlci. That less valuable 
pasture land was valued at $600 per acre. JEd.. 13.66 acres of 
pasture land that remained with out water was valued at $400.00 per 
acre. _Id. Mr. Fujii determined that the total fair market value 
of the property was $29,964. JEd. Because the property was 
landlocked, an adjustment of $19,400 was appropriate leaving a 
value of the property of $10,600. Id, at 22. 
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20. Ferrebee provided three appraisals prepared by two 
different appraisers, Mr. Phillip A. Snell and Mr. J. Philip Cook. 
R.439, at 295. Mr. Snell's first appraisal determined that the 
property's highest and best use was the existing agricultural use, 
and valued all of the property at the same price per acre, $1,900 
per acre or $85,000.00. R.439, at 795, Exhibit 21, p. iv. Mr. 
Snell used the comparable sales approach and made specific 
adjustments of specific sales for zoning, size, frontage, soil 
type, and water rights. Id.
 f at pp. 13-14. Mr. Snell did not make 
any adjustment for the property being landlocked. JA. Mr. Snell 
also!made no adjustment for the property's proximity to the airport 
finding that it had no particular impact on land values. JEd., p. 
6. 
21. Mr. Snell provided a second appraisal which departed from 
his first appraisal both in approach and conclusion. R.439, at 
795, Exhibit 21. Mr. Snell changed his determination as to highest 
and best use finding that the Ferrebee's property had a highest and 
best use that was "interim, agricultural with ultimate usage for 
expansion of the Tooele Valley airport or some other airport 
related usage." Id../ at p. iv. Mr. Snell again used the 
comparable sales approach but departed from the approach by not 
making any adjustments to the nineteen comparable sales identified. 
Fifteen sales were by one seller, Terracor, which he determined to 
be distressed sales, Ld. , at p. 23, and four were by other sellers. 
Id. Mr. Snell averaged the Terracor sales, i.e. the sum of all 
sales divided by the total acreage, and adjusted that total upward 
9 
by 30% because of the distressed sales. _Id. Mr. Snell then 
averaged the remaining four sales. JEd. From these averages, Mr. 
Snell determined that the "Ferrebee property (with the exception of 
airport influences) is $1,153.00" per acre. Id. 
22. Mr. Snell then proposed an adjustment for "airport 
influence" based on comparable sales of property adjoining other 
rural airports in Utah, Colorado, and Kansas. R.439, at 795, 
Exhibit 23, pp. 15-23. While ostensibly a "Sales Comparison 
Approach", Mr. Snell identified specific sales of property to 
municipalities for use in expansion of their airports. All but one 
of the sales were by condemnation or under threat of condemnation. 
R.439, at 766. Mr. Snell then allegedly inquired of individuals, 
whose qualifications were unknown, R.439, at 768-787, to determine 
what "similar property" away from the airport sold for. R.439, 
Exhibit 23, pp. 19-21. Mr. Snell then compared the identified 
sales with the price for "similar property" no adjoining the 
airports to arrive at a percentage figure which he characterized as 
an "airport influence." JOd. , p. 21. He multiplied this airport 
influence factor, in this case 100%, to the value of the Ferrebee 
property arrive at a fair market value of $2,306.00 per acre or 
$100,000.00. Id.., p. 24. In his second appraisal, Mr. Snell made 
no adjustment for the property being landlocked. 
23. Mr. Cook used a similar approach to Mr. Snell in 
determining fair market value. R.434, at 11, Exhibits 91 and 92. 
Mr. Cook used allegedly comparable sales data to analyze the value 
of the Ferrebee property and determined that the value of the 
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property was $74,000.00. JTd. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. 
Cook analyzed the Ferrebee property and determined that its highest 
and best use was" agricultural on an interim basis with speculation 
for future use in conjunction with the airport." _Id.. Mr. Cook 
then used comparable sales data from sales of land in Tooele County 
to determine that the property had a "based agricultural value" of 
$1,500.00 per acre for 30 acres and $500.00 per acre for 13.66 
acres for a total base agricultural value of $52,000.00. Id../ pp. 
40, 44. Specifically, Mr. Cook determined that the Ferrebee 
property was worth $500.00 per acre without water, and that an 
adjustment of $1,000.00 per acre was necessary for 30 acres of the 
property because of the 10 acres of well water and 20 acres of 
drain water rights Ferrebee held. JA. Mr. Cook determined that 
well water and drain water should be valued the same at $1,000.00 
per acre. R.434, at 99. Mr. Cook discounted this "base 
agricultural value" by 37% or $19,240.00 because it was landlocked, 
leaving a discounted base agricultural value of $32,760.00. R.434, 
Exhibit 91, pp. 40-2. Mr. Cook then adjusted this base 
agricultural value upward by 125% or $40,950.00 because the 
property was situated contiguous to the airport. JId., p. 44. The 
125% enhancement figure was justified on the basis that the 
Ferrebee property was enhanced because of its proximity to the 
airport, and because of the County's need for the property in the 
future. R.434, at 170, 192. 
24. Mr. Cook established his "airport proximity enhancement" 
factor by taking the information from Mr. Snell's appraisal R.434, 
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at 163, and comparing "sales of land located adjacent to airports 
in the Intermountain Region . . . with similar property lacking the 
adjacent airport location." R.434, Exhibit 91, pp. 42-43. Opinion 
concerning the value "similar property lacking the adjacent airport 
location" was taken from individuals with unknown qualifications. 
R.434, at 167-8. From the comparison, Mr. Cook arrived at a 
"premium paid by the County or airport authority when acquiring 
land adjacent to airports for expansion purposes." R.434, Exhibit 
91, p. 43. The enhancement figure arrived at by Mr. Cook was 125% 
of the "based agricultural value." JLci. , at 44. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erroneously based its finding of fair market 
value on the appraisal of Ferrebee's appraiser, J. Philip Cook, and 
erroneously concluded that the Ferrebee property was entitled to an 
enhancement value based on its more proximity to the airport. 
Ferrebee failed to carry his burden of proof establishing a 
higher and better use than the agricultural use the property is 
currently and has historically been used for. Specifically, 
Ferrebee failed to establish a legal feasibility of his proposed 
higher and better use by failing to show that the zoning would be 
changed to accommodate such a higher and better use of the 
property. The evidence before the lower court demonstrated that 
since Ferrebee's property was to be used in the physical layout of 
the airport, including use in the taxiways and apron it would be 
impossible to get the County to zone the property to permit an 
enhanced private use. 
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Ferrebee, also, failed to establish)an economic feasibility 
for his proposed higher and better use. No evidence was provided 
to demonstrate a realistic, viable market for the properties 
enhanced use for commercial or industrial use. All of the 
appraisers who testified conceded that there was no financial 
demand for development property near the airport. 
The Cook appraisal, relied upon by the lower court to assess 
fair market value, improperly calculated fair market value based on 
"enhancement factor" which was based on the County's need for the 
property. The Cook appraisal calculated a "premium" that Ferrebee 
could expect to receive from Tooele County because it needed the 
Ferrebee property to complete the airport. A consideration of the 
enhanced value of the property created by the condemning agencies 
activities in the market place is not proper in determining fair 
market value as a matter of law. 
Finally, the evidence submitted by Ferrebee's appraisers to 
establish the "enhancement value" or "premium" to be extracted from 
Tooele County because of its need for the property was erroneously 
admitted by the lower court over counsels' objections. The 
objectionable evidence consisted of sales completed through 
condemnation or under threat of condemnation and are thus 
inadmissible. In addition, the essential analysis in arriving at 
the "enhancement" value was the comparison of certain identified 
sales of property to municipalities for use in expanding existing 
airports, with "similar" property in those areas that were not next 
to the airport. The process of determining the comparability or 
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similarity of the properties compared was not performed by 
Ferrebee's appraisers. Ferrebee's appraisers offered as evidence 
the opinions of others whose qualifications were unknown as to the 
value of other "similar" property for use in calculating the 
"premium" for property next to the airports. This type of evidence 
is impermissible hearsay, which puts beyond examination the 
essential issue of comparability. The lower court should have 
stricken that evidence, but failed to do so. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
This appeal addresses certain issues concerning the 
sufficiency of evidence to support the lower court's finding of 
fact as to the fair market value of the Ferrebee property and 
concerning the lower court's conclusion of law that the property is 
entitled to an enhancement value based on its proximity to the 
Tooele Valley airport. 
Both legal conclusions and factual findings are assigned as 
error in this case. The standard of review for errors of law is 
that "[a] trial court's conclusions are accorded no particular 
deference" and they are reviewed for "correctness." Bellon v. 
Malner, 157 Utah Adv. Rp. 41, 42 (March 29, 1991), citing Grayson 
Paper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P. 2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). With 
regard to a trial court's finding of fact they "will not be set 
aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous." .Id.; Utah R. Civ. P 
52(a). 
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I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING FERREBEE'S APPRAISAL AS ITS 
BASIS FOR ASSESSING FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation." The determination of just compensation for the 
taking of real property for a public use is determined by assessing 
the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking. 
See §78-34-11 of the Utah Code Annotated (for the purpose of 
assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be 
deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons . . 
. " ) ; Southern Pacific Company vs. Arthur, 352 P.2d 693 (Utah 1960). 
Fair market value has been defined in many ways, however, the 
generally accepted definition is)"what . . . a purchaser, willing 
to buy but not required to so, pay, and what . . . a seller, 
willing to sell but not required to do so, ask". State v. Noble, 
305 P.2d 495, 498 (Utah 1957), Utah State Road Commission v. 
Freeberq, 687 P.2d 827 (Utah 1984). 
The lower court found that "[t]he appraisal of Phil Cook, 
Ferrebee's appraiser, is the best estimate of the fair market value 
of the Subject Property, and was adopted by the Court as the true 
market value of the Subject Property." R.410. That finding by the 
court is against the clear weight of evidence. Ferrebee failed to 
carry his burden of proof as to the higher and better use proposed 
by the Cook appraisal, and the Cook appraisal improperly bases its 
fair market valuation on an enhancement value that is not 
supportable in law or fact. The lower court also erred in its 
conclusion that "Ferrebee is entitle" to be paid the fair market 
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value of the Subject Property . . . as enhanced by its proximity to 
the airport." R.412. In addition, the Cook appraisal is based on 
incompetent, hearsay evidence which the lower court erroneously 
failed to exclude. 
The findings and conclusions of the lower court as to the fair 
market value of the Ferrebee property should be rejected and the 
matter remanded to the District Court for the entry of findings 
consistent with the appraisals provided by Tooele County. 
A. FERREBEE FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH 
A HIGH AND BETTER USE. 
Analysis of fair market value is generally calculated at the 
present use of the land, unless the condemnee can establish a 
better use. Brinkerhoff, Eminent Domain: Proving Highest and Best 
Use of Undeveloped Land In Utah, 1973 Utah L. Review, 705 (1973) 
(hereafter "Brinkerhoff"). Thus, where there is a discrepancy 
between the condemnor and condemnee as to the use of the property, 
the burden is upon the condemnee to show a higher and better use 
for the property which will increase the value of the property 
commensurately. Movie v. Salt Lake City, 176 P. 2d 582 (Utah 1947). 
While the condemnee is entitled to valuation of his property 
applied to the highest and best use to which it could be put at the 
time of the taking, evidence of the highest and best use, or "its 
projected use, affecting value, "must be not only possible, but 
reasonably probably. It must not be merely in the realm of 
speculation because the land is adaptable to a particular use in 
the remote and uncertain future." State v. Jacobs, 397 P.2d 463, 
464 (Utah 1964). The court may consider a higher and better use of 
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the property other than the present use only when the condemnee 
proves three elements of feasibility with respect to the higher and 
best use: (1) physical feasibility, i.e., is the land adaptable to 
the suggested use? (2) legal feasibility, i.e., is the land 
available for the suggest use? (3) economic feasibility, i.e., is 
there demand for the suggested use?r Weiss, The Effect of Zoning on 
Market Value, Seventh Institute on Eminent Domain 28 (1967), 4 
Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, §12,322[2], note 5 (3rd Edition), 
Brinkerhoff, supra, at 708. Failure to prove any one of the three 
elements of feasibility defeats the contended higher and better 
use, and the fair market value of the property must be determined 
at its existing use. State v. Jacobs, supra; Liere v. State, 333 
N.Y.S.2d 266 (New York 1972); Brinkerhoff, supra. 
The evidence before the lower court from all of the appraisers 
who testified or otherwise presented evidence is that the 
property's current use is consistent with its A-20 zoning, i.e., an 
agricultural use permitting one farm residence for every twenty 
acres. R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, pp. 20-23; R.439, 629. In 
addition, testimony of both Ferrebee and his tenant on the property 
disclose that for the last fifty-five years the property has keen 
used for nothing but pasture. The properties agricultural use is 
limited to its existing grazing use because of the high alkaline 
content of the soil, and its high water table because of it 
proximity to the Great Salt Lake. R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, pp. 
20-21; R.437, at 491, Exhibit 17, pp. 10-12. 
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Tooele County's appraisers Messrs. Fujii and Webber valued the 
Ferrebee property based on its highest and best use as agricultural 
indicating that approximately 25% of the land might be used for 
cultivation with the remaining 75% being used only for marginal 
pasture. 
Ferrebee's appraiser, Phillip Snell, initially valued the 
property based on the same highest and best use, agricultural, but 
then some three years later changed his appraisal claiming the 
highest and best use as "interim, agricultural with)ultimate usage 
for expansion of the Tooele Valley airport or some other airport 
related usage." Similarly, Ferrebee's second appraiser, Phil Cook, 
valued the property based on a highest and best use as 
"agricultural with speculation for future use in conjunction with 
the airport." It is Ferrebee's burden of proof, therefore, to 
establish this higher and better use. 
Ferrebee failed to carry his burden of proof as to the alleged 
higher and better use by failing to establish any legal or economic 
feasibility for that use. In fact, all of the evidence before the 
lower court clearly established that it was highly unlikely that 
zoning would have been changed to permit private development of the 
land, and that there was absolutely no demand for use of the 
property in conjunction with the airport. 
(1) THE FERREBEE PROPERTY LEGALLY COULD NOT BE USED FOR 
ANYTHING OTHER THAN ITS EXISTING AGRICULTURAL USE. 
Legal feasibility involves a determination of whether the 
restrictions on land, both governmental and private would permit a 
contended higher and better use. Most important in this 
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determination is the zoning of the property. Brinkerhoff, supra, 
at 710. If property is restricted by zoning to a particular use, 
property value must generally be based upon that use only. Id. 
As indicated above the Ferrebee property was zoned A-20 and 
had limited development potential under that designation to one 
residential dwelling for every twenty acres. R.437, at 491, 
Exhibit 17, p.10; R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 24. The higher and 
better use contemplated by Ferrebee's appraisers would have 
required a zoning change to some industrial or commercial zoning, 
yet Ferrebee offered absolutely no evidence as to the possibility 
or likelihood of a zoning change for any higher or better use. 
The Ferrebee property is within the airport development plan 
and was always projected for taking by the County. Testimony of 
the County Director of Development established that it was 
extremely unlikely that any enhanced private use of Ferrebee's 
property would be approved or permitted by Tooele County which is 
inconsistent with the use of the property as part of the airport. 
R.435, at 59, pp. 186-7. It should also be noted that Ferrebee's 
property was to be used as part of the airport taxi strip and 
apron, thus this property was a fundamental part of the development 
plan and could not be realistically developed for any private use 
in connection with the airport. Thus, any request for development 
of the Ferrebee property would have been in direct conflict with 
its projected use as part of the airport improvements. 
Ferrebee completely failed to carry his burden of proof as to 
the legal feasibility of the proposed higher and better use, and 
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thus, the Court should reject the lower court's finding that Phil 
Cook's appraisal based on that unsubstantiated higher and better 
use is the best estimate of fair market value. Brinkerhoff, supra. 
(2) THERE IS NO DEMAND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FERREBEE PROPERTY TO SUPPORT THE ECONOMIC 
FEASIBILITY OF A HIGHER AND BETTER USE. 
Economic feasibility focuses on whether, in fact, there is a 
real need, or demand for the contended higher and better use. 
State v. Tedesco, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956). In order to carry his 
burden of proof as to a higher or better use, Ferrebee must 
demonstrate a "viable market" for the proposed use at the time of 
the condemnation. State v. Hopkins, 506 P. 2d 57 (Utah 1973), State 
v. Tedesco, supra, Redevelopment v. Mitsui, 522 P.2d 1370, 1372 
(Utah 19 74) ("the value of the condemned property is to be 
determined as of the date and under the circumstances existing at 
the time of the taking and that ordinarily evidence of subsequent 
occurrences is not admissible or bearing thereon.") No evidence 
was presented to the lower court that would indicate any interest 
in development of any land next to or near the airport at the time 
of this taking in 1986. In fact, the evidence establishes exactly 
the opposite. 
Ferrebee's first appraiser, Mr. Snell, concluded in his first 
appraisal that "[p]resently [the airport] is being used more for 
recreational activity than for business or community service. It 
is not considered to be a viable force affecting the economy or 
land values in the vicinity." R.439, at 795, Exhibit 21, p. 6. 
Ferrebee's second appraiser, Phil Cook, also conceded he was not 
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aware of any demand from any entrepreneur or other developer to 
acquire and develop either commercially or industrially any 
property near the airport. R.434, at 128. Thus, Ferrebee could 
point to no "viable market" for the proposed higher and better use 
at the time of the condemnation. 
The only evidence offered by Ferrebee relating to any demand 
for the development of the area around the airport were rumors Mr. 
Cook heard three years after the date of the taking concerning Salt 
Lake International's interest in acquiring the airport as a 
reliever airport , R.434, at 119-126, and the possibility the 
airport would expand based on studies that had been prepared by the 
FAA. Id. 
Specifically, in his appraisal Mr. Cook wrote: 
As to demand, the appraiser has reviewed studies prepared by 
Tooele County, the Wasatch Front Regional Counsel and 
Mountainlands Association of Governments, concerning airports 
along the Wasatch Front. Briefly, these studies indicate that 
the Tooele Valley Airport should ultimately be upgraded from 
its current status as a basic utility airport to a reliever 
airport for Salt Lake International. While current demand 
does not justify this, the study is obviously forward 
thinking. 
R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 28. 
In addition, Mr. Cook considered the possibility that the property 
might be developed with a through-the-fence access to the airport, 
i.e., direct access to the airport through the boundary fence, but 
then conceded that the preferred method of developing through-the-
fence developments is for the County to buy the property and lease 
it back to the developer. JId. Such speculative development would 
not increase the fair market value of the property. 
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The rumors referred to by Mr. Cook were those heard in 19 89, 
three years after the filing of this suit. The County's 
Development Director testified that the interest reflected in the 
rumors were recent and no. inquiries or interest was shown in the 
airport by Salt Lake International during the relevant time period 
in 1986. R.435, at 136-37. Thus, the rumors and the conclusions 
reached based on those rumors are at best speculative and do not 
indicate any viable market for the proposed use. Finally, the 
acquisition of Tooele County Airport by Salt Lake International 
does not necessarily create an immediate need or market for the 
Ferrebee property at some higher or better use. Ferrebee provided 
no evidence to establish an increased market even!if the airport 
was acquired by Salt Lake International. 
Finally, the reports)referred to by Cook relating to airport 
expansion were repudiated by Tooele County as being unrealistic, 
and having no basis in fact. R.435, at 143, 153. Tooele County 
provided specific evidence to the court that for years it tried to 
lease 11 acres of the airport property which had been set aside for 
lease development and after exhaustive efforts did not receive one 
single offer to commercially lease or develop any part of the 
airport. R.435, at 305-6. There was clearly no demand for 
development property at the time of the taking. R.435, at 155. 
In short, the clear weight of the evidence established that in 
1986, at the time of the taking, there was9no interest in private 
or quasi public development of any part of the airport. R.434, at 
127. Ferrebee failed to carry his burden of proof as to the 
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economic feasibility of a higher and better use for his property, 
and thus the lower court's finding of fair market value based 
Ferrebee's appraisals premised on this higher or better use must be 
rejected. 
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT FERREBEE'S 
PROPERTY IS ENTITLED TO AN ENHANCEMENT VALUE BECAUSE OF 
ITS PROXIMITY TO THE AIRPORT. 
In the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
court found that the "fair market value of the property is enhanced 
by its proximity to the initial construction of the airport" R.413, 
and concluded that "Ferrebee is entitled to be paid the fair market 
value of the Subject Property . . . as enhanced by its proximity to 
the airport." R.414. Under the facts of this case, the court 
erred in concluding that the property was enhanced by its proximity 
to the airport, and the court's finding that an enhancement value 
was appropriate is against the clear weight of the evidence. In 
addition the lower court erred in fail nh to exclude evidence 
concerning the alleged enhancement value since it was based on 
incompetent, hearsay evidence. 
Ferrebee submits that his property is unique because of its 
proximity }o the airport and that special consideration should be 
given to an enhancement of the property because of its location. 
Specifically, Ferrebee's appraiser, Phil Cook, wrote in his 
appraisal that 
the subject is a unique property as to proximity to the east 
side of the airport, and consequently has potential for use in 
conjunction with the airport, either privately or publicly. 
There is limited demand at present for use of this land. With 
the published projections of future demand, related primarily 
to excess demand at Salt Lake International as opposed to 
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demand inherent within Tooele County, these factors translate 
to speculative value." 
R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 29. 
The analysis employed by Ferrebee's appraisers Cook and Snell 
to enhance the property by its proximity to the airport was to 
first establish a "base agricultural value" of the property by the 
comparable sales approach, i.e., comparing Ferrebee's property to 
other sales of agricultural property in or about Tooele County 
without considering the influences of the airport. Once a "base 
agricultural value" is established, the "airport enhancement 
factor" was applied as a percentage adjustment. This percentage 
adjustment was arrived at by using a comparable sales approach but 
not in the standard way. Ferrebee's appraisers made comparison not 
between specifically identified comparable sales and the Ferrebee 
property, something they conceded could not be done, but made a 
comparison between sales of property located next to other airports 
and "similar" property in the same area "lacking the adjacent 
airport location." R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 43. Mr. Cook 
noted in his appraisal that, 
It should be noted that the airports are generally 
located in rural communities surrounded by agricultural 
property . . . 
The following table shows the premium paid by the 
county or airport authority when acquiring land adjacent 
to airports for expansion purposes. Two of the six 
transactions were made under condemnation and are awards 
dictated by the court. These two transactions should 
therefore be considered cautiously. (emphasis added) 
Id. 
Critical to Ferrebee's appraiser's technique was comparing the 
identified purchase prior to what "similar agricultural ground not 
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adjoining the airport has sold or is available for . . . " Jd. , p. 
42. To arrive at what "similar agricultural ground not adjoining 
the airport has sold or is available for" the Ferrebee' s appraisers 
did not review any specific comparable, or inspect any property, 
instead the appraisers solicited opinions from individuals in those 
areas for an estimate of value of "similar" property. R.434, at 
165-68. Predictably the opinions as to the value ranged wildly, 
22% to 365%, which was then conservatively estimated by the 
appraiser to reflect a "premium" of 125%. R.434, at 11, Exhibit 
91, p. 44. That percentage was applied to the "base agricultural 
value" to more than double the final fair market value of the 
Ferrebee property. 
Ferrebee's appraisers contend that the enhancement factor is 
necessary because of "future private development" or "potential 
future public use." R.434, at 119. Neither of these uses are 
warranted by the facts in this case, and the lower court erred as 
a matter of law in permitting evidence of future public use as 
enhancing the value of the property. 
(1) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ANY 
ENHANCEMENT BASED ON PRIVATE DEMAND FOR THE 
PROPERTY 
With regard to the question of private development of the 
airport, all of the appraisers who testified in this case agreed 
that there was no demand for any private economic development of 
that property. For example, Messrs. Fujii and Webber both 
testified that the proximity of the airport does not warrant any 
economic adjustment to the property because of the lack of demand 
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for development use. The County's Development Director testified 
that the County was willing to lease property on the airport itself 
for almost nothing in order to promote some development on the 
airport. At the time of the taking, no developer had showed any 
interest in leasing or developing any of the property. In 
addition, whatever demand might be inferred for private 
development, Ferrebee offers no analysis of what that value might 
be. 
The evidence of an enhancement value offered by Ferrebee's 
appraisers does not address private development, no comparable are 
offered and no analysis is given. Instead, the only analysis given 
relates to the "premium" that a county can be expected to pay for 
property needed to expand its airport. 
Based on the fact that there is no evidence of any economic 
demand for the property for commercial or industrial development of 
the property use and that Ferrebee has not provided any analysis 
which would address enhanced value based on private demand, an 
enhancement value for the property is unwarranted, and against the 
clear weight of evidence. 
(2) THE COUNTY'S NEED FOR THE PROPERTY FOR EXPANSION OF 
THE AIRPORT CANNOT AS A MATTER OF LAW BE CONSIDERED 
IN DETERMINING FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
The substance of Ferrebee's analysis to support an 
"enhancement value" of the property relates to an alleged "premium" 
that can be exacted from Tooele County because the property will be 
needed for use in completing the design for the Tooele Valley 
Airport. All of the comparable sales information provided in 
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support of Ferrebee's "airport enhancement factor" involved 
municipalities)acquiring land by condemnation or under threat of 
condemnation for expansion of their airports. Fundamentally, 
Ferrebee's contention that he is entitled to consider Tooele 
County's need for the property to complete the airport is contrary 
to well accepted legal principles of condemnation law. In 
addition, the evidence Ferrebee provided to support his claim is 
incompetent and hearsay evidence which should not have been 
admitted by the lower court. 
(a) ANY INCREASED VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE 
COUNTY'S NEED FOR THE PROPERTY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED 
IN ARRIVING AT A FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
In the lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
the court found that "at the time the County planned construction 
of the Tooele County Airport, Ferrebee owned eighty (80) acres of 
ground in the are of the planned airport," R.409, and that the 
"County's original Airport Layout Plan for the airport included 
approximately sixty-eight (68) acres of Ferrebee's 80 acre parcel. 
Approximately twelve (12) of Ferrebee's acres were not included in 
the County's original plan." R.409. Evidence provided to the 
lower court indicated that the 12 acres of land not originally 
planned in the original plan consisted of a 100 foot long strip the 
length of his property boundary. R.435, at 148. That 12 acre 
piece of property was deemed an uneconomic remainder, and Tooele 
County understood that under the requirements of the FAA it was had 
to acquire that property. R.435, at 160, 207-8, 238. Thus, from 
the inception of the Tooele Valley Airport, the Ferrebee property 
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was always considered to be property that would be taken for use in 
the airport. 
Under generally recognized principals of condemnation law, 
where property is understood to be within the boundaries of a 
public project, the fact that the property will eventually be taken 
by the public use cannot be taken into consideration in determining 
its value. 
If the exact location of the improvement is 
known from the outset, the property that will 
serve as the site of the improvement will not 
be subject to any rise or fall in values. 
This is so because the property is bound to be 
taken if the improvement is, in fact, 
constructed, and, therefore, it can neither 
suffer from, nor enjoy, the effects of the 
existence of the improvement in its 
neighborhood. 
4 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, §12 B.17[2] p. 12b-212. Under 
Utah Law it is specifically recognized that any enhancement or 
decrease in value attributable to the purpose for which the 
property is being condemned can not be considered in determining 
the fair market value of the property. Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City v. Grutter, 734 P.2d 434 (Utah 1986). 
In Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 347 P.2d 
862 (Utah 1959), the Utah Supreme Court considered the question of 
the valuation of property which was being condemned for use in the 
enlargement of the Pineview Reservoir in Ogden Valley. The 
condemnor in that case argued that the "value of the property for 
condemnation purposes should be determined without consideration of 
the fact that the condemnor has entered the market and planned 
improvements . . . the condemnor should not be allowed an advantage 
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from the fact that the condemnor is improving the area and the 
latter be required to pay a higher price and thus in effect suffer 
a penalty because of its own improvements." .Id./ at 863 (footnotes 
omitted). The Supreme Court rejected that approach stating that 
"the condemnee is entitled to the fair market value of his property 
at the time of the service of the summons in the condemnation 
proceeding as provided by statute; and all factors bearing upon 
such value, that any prudent purchaser would take into account at 
that time, should be given consideration including any potential 
development in the area reasonably to be expected." JEd. (footnotes 
omitted). 
Thereafter, in Redevelopment Agency v. Grutter, supra, the 
Utah Supreme Court repudiated the position taken in Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District v. Ward, and held that "in condemnation 
proceedings, any enhancement or decrease in value attributable to 
the purpose for which the property is being condemned, shall be 
excluded in determining the fair market value of the property. 
This rule conforms to legislative intent and to sound policy." Id. 
at 437. 
The holding in Grutter is in conformance with the holdings of 
the United States Supreme Court. In United States v. Cors , 337 
U.S. 325, 333-334 (1949) the United States Supreme Court stated 
that 
It is not fair that the government be required 
to pay the enhanced price which its demand 
alone has created. That enhancement reflects 
elements of the value that was created by the 
urgency of its need for the article. It does 
not reflect what a "willing buyer would pay in 
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cash to a willing seller" (citations omitted) 
in a fair market. It represents what can be 
expected from the government whose demands in 
the emergency have created a seller's market. 
In this situation, as in the case of land 
included in a proposed project of the 
government, the enhanced value reflects 
speculation as to what the government can be 
compelled to pay. That is a holdup value, and 
not a fair market value. That is a value 
which the government itself created and hence, 
in fairness, should not be required to pay. 
Commentators have also concurred that enhancement created by 
the project itself should not be considered for the purposes of 
valuation. In Condemnation Procedures and Techniques, the author 
states that "in the majority of the cases, the determination of 
whether enhancement will be allowed or denied is made to turn on 
what some courts have termed the 'possibility of inclusion' test 
or rule . . . Broadly speaking, it may be said that appreciation in 
value will be denied if it is probably the lands "ill be included 
in the project, and enhancement in value will be allowed if it is 
not probable that the lands will be included in the project." 
Rohan and Reskin, Condemnation Procedures and Techniques, §8.06[7] 
Page 8-204.4. 
Utah, therefore, is in line with the majority of jurisdictions 
which would deny any enhancement value created by the expansion or 
improvement of the public use where it was always anticipated that 
property would eventually be acquired for the public use. The 
testimony of Ferrebee's appraisers indicates that it is this very 
type of enhancement value that they were looking at in determining 
the amount of the adjustment to be made for the proximity of the 
property to the airport. All of the comparable sales that were 
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provided by Ferrebee's appraisers to substantiate a enhancement 
factor were properties that were taken in condemnation, or under 
threat of condemnation and were meant to show what additional 
amount or "premium" a municipality would be willing to pay for 
property needed in the expansion of its projects. 
Ferrebee's appraisers, and particularly the appraisal of Phil 
Cook, incorrectly based their valuation of Ferrebee's property on 
Tooele County's continuing need for the property. Where the 
determination of the fair market value of Ferrebee's property is 
based on such an improper premise that determination of fair market 
value should be rejected. 
(b) EVIDENCE OF COMPARABLE BASED ON PROPERTY 
ACQUIRED THROUGH CONDEMNATION OR UNDER THREAT OF 
CONDEMNATION IS INADMISSABLE. 
The Courts have uniformly denied the admissability of values 
based on forced sales or sales under the threat of condemnation. 
Based upon a variety or reasons, e.g., that such payments are in 
the nature of compromise to avoid the expense and uncertainty of 
litigation and so are not fair indications of market value, that 
such evidence complicates the record, confuses the issues, is 
misleading, and, especially in a condemnation cases, raises 
collateral issues as to the conditions under which such sales were 
made, the overwhelming view of the Courts and commentators is that 
the sum paid by the condemnor for similar lands, even if 
condemnation proceedings have not begun, is inadmissable. Slattery 
Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 37, 40-41 (C.A. 5 1956); United 
States v. Bailey, 115 F.2d 433, 434 (C.A. 5, 1940); Evans v. United 
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States, 326 F.2d 827, 831 (C.A. 8, 1964); Hickey v. United States, 
208 F.2d 269, 275 (C.A. 3, 1953), cert. den. 347 U.S. 919; Murdock 
v. United States, 160 F.2d 358, 362 (C.A. 8, 1947); United States 
v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land in New Jersey, 158 F.2d 874, 877 (C.A. 
3, 1946); United States v. Foster, 131 F.2d 3, 5 (C.A. 8, 1942), 
cert. den. 318 U.S. 767; United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Reynolds, 
115 F.2d 294, 296 (C.A. 5, 1940). 
The reasoning which forbids consideration of forced sales 
also renders it incompetent for either party to put in 
evidence the amount paid by the condemnor to the owners 
of neighboring lands and taken at the same time, and as 
part of the same proceedings, however similar they may be 
to that in controversy (irrespective of whether the 
payment was made as a result of a voluntary settlement, 
an award, or the verdict of a jury). The right of an 
owner to recover just compensation for the taking of his 
land are not to be measured by the generosity, necessity, 
estimated advantage, or fear or dislike of condemnation 
which may have induced others to part with the title to 
their property, or to relinquish claims for damages by 
reason of injuries thereto. If a sale is made to a 
condemnor that is about to institute proceedings if it 
cannot acquire the land by purchase at a satisfactory 
price, the amount paid is not a fair test of market 
value. 
4 Nichols, supra, §12.3113 [2], p. 12-178. 
Almost without exception the comparable sales used by 
Ferrebee's appraisers were properties either taken by condemnation 
or under threat of condemnation. These properties are not a proper 
basis for any part of the calculation of fair market value. The 
lower court's failure to exclude the comparable sales which reflect 
acquisitions taken by condemnation or under threat of condemnation 
is an abuse of discretion. The lower courts finding of fair market 
value based on Ferrebee's appraisal's which use such comparable, 
including the appraisal of Phil Cook should be rejected. 
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(c) FERREBEE'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ALLEGED 
ENHANCEMENT FACTOR IS BASED ON INADMISSABLE HEARSAY 
WHICH THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO EXCLUDE 
The evidence as to enhancement value was objected to 
repeatedly because it was based on impermissible hearsay evidence. 
R.439, at 768; R.440, at 934. The lower court erroneously over-
ruled counsels objections and permitted the admittance of the 
evidence. 
After a long history of deep soul searching Courts now 
generally admit over objections of hearsay and best evidence facts 
and data gathered by an expert which he uses as a basis for his 
opinion. 12 ALR 3d 1064, Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence. In 
this instance, however, what is being objected to are not the 
"facts and data" which were assembled and analyzed by the 
appraiser, but the use of opinions of out-of-court witnesses who 
opined as to the value of "similar" property for comparison with 
specifically identified comparable sales. It is these out-of-court 
opinions which can not be impeached by cross examination and which 
allow the appraiser to shield his conclusions from full examination 
and scrutiny.1 
Comparable sales must "meet the test of 'reasonable 
comparability.' That is, that . . . factors exist in sufficient 
similarity that the sale can fairly be regarded as having some 
probative value in arriving at a proper appraisal of the property." 
An expert witnesses opinion must be his own, he cannot 
act as a mere conduit for the opinions of others. Warren v. 
Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 235 A.2d 295, cert denied, 390 
U.S. 1006. 
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Redevelopment AQ . of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui, Inc., 522 P. 2d 1370, 
1373 (Utah 1974). Factors to be considered are: (1) geographical 
proximity; (2) similarity in the quality, size, character, 
situation, usability, and improvements on the property; (3) 
proximity of the time of sale; and (4) similarity in the condition 
of sale. Brinkerhoff, supra, at 716. Since land is unique and 
that it is impossible to find an identical piece of property for 
comparison purposes, it is incumbent upon the appraiser to make 
adjustments to comparable sales to demonstrate similarity. 5 
Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, Section 21.3[1], p. 231. If an 
appraiser "fails to give property consideration or weight to any 
particular factor that goes to the credibility and not to the 
admissibility of his evidence. If it has deficiencies, they are 
subject to exposure or cross-examination . . . ." Mitsui, supra, 
at 1373(emphasis added). 
In this case the weighing of the various comparability factors 
was made by individuals, whose qualifications to make those 
decisions were admittedly unknown, and who were not witnesses in 
the case. The "similarity" of the property used to compare the 
various airport sales with is the key to establishing the alleged 
value of the airport influence. That comparison process, however, 
was completely foreclosed from examination because the individuals 
making that assessment were not before the court, and yet their 
opinions were admitted in evidence. 
On cross examination of Ferrebee's appraisers concerning their 
analysis of the comparable sales at arriving at the airport 
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influence factor, none of the comparability factors could be tested 
or examined since the appraisers had no specific information about 
them and simply relied on hearsay opinions of others as to the 
"similarity" of the properties. Thus, the exposure of the 
deficiency in analysis was impossible and the work of the appraiser 
was shielded from review by reliance on the opinion of others. 
These hearsay opinions and conclusions should have been excluded by 
the lower court, and the lower court abused its discretion in 
permitting hearsay opinions into evidence where their reliability 
is at issue and could not be examined. 
The lower court abused its discretion in failing to exclude 
the hearsay evidence presented in an attempt to establish an 
"airport enhancement value." Furthermore, the lower court's 
Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law based on an appraisal which 
relies on incompetent evidence should be rejected. County of Los 
Angeles v. Fans, 304 P.2d 257, 261 (Cal. 1957). 
II. CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in relying on the Cook appraisal. Its 
conclusion as to the fair market value of Ferrebee's property is 
not supported by the clear weight of the evidence, and the lower 
court's conclusion of law that the property is entitled to an 
enhancement value is plain error. 
Ferrebee's appraisers proposed a "premium" to be exacted from 
Tooele County because of the County's need for the property to 
complete the airport. The law in Utah is clear that enhancement 
attributable to the purpose for which the property is being 
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condemned can not be used in determining fair market value. Since 
that is exactly what Ferrebee's appraisers proposed, their 
appraisals and finding premised thereon must be rejected. 
Finally, the evidence used by Ferrebee's appraiser's to 
establish its "premium" is incompetent since it was based, almost 
exclusively, on sales completed through condemnation or under 
threat of condemnation. In addition, the evidence offered in 
support of the "premium" included as the essential element 
impermissible hearsay opinions of out-of-court witnesses. That 
evidence should have been stricken by the lower court. 
The findings and conclusions of the lower court should be 
rejected and the matter remanded for the entry of findings which 
are consistent with the appraisals provided by Tooele County. 
DATED this ^ 6 r ^ d a y of July, 1991. 
STOKER & THOMAS 
David B. Thomas 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby verifies that on the 
^k 
day of 
July, 1991, a tru^ and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Evan A. Schmutz 
Holme Roberts & Owen 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
JOSEPH WILEY FERREBEE, ) 
Trustee of the Ferrebee ) Civil No. CV-86-156 
1976 Family Trust, ) 
) Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on July 11 through July 14, 1989, 
and concluded on August 29, 1989. The plaintiff, Board of County 
Commissioners of Tooele County (the "County"), was represented by 
David B. Thomas; the defendant, Joseph Wiley Ferrebee 
("Ferrebee"), was represented by Evan A. Schmutz and Robert A. 
Goodman. The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
having received the evidence, rendered its bench ruling on August 
29, 1989, at the conclusion of the trial. After hearings on 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law held on January 
24 and March 15, 1990, the Court now makes the following Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In the 1970 !s, the County devised a plan to 
construct the Tooele County Airport near Erda, Utah. 
2. At the time the County planned construction of the 
Tooele County Airport/ Ferrebee owned eighty (80) acres of ground 
in the area of the planned airport. 
3. The County's original Airport Layouts Plan for the 
airport included approximately sixty-eight (68) acres of 
Ferrebee's eighty (80) acre parcel. Approximately twelve (12) of 
the Ferrebee acres were not included in the County's original 
plan. 
4. On May 16, 1986/ after the initial construction of 
the airport/ the County filed this action to condemn the remain-
ing forty-three (43) acres of the Ferrebee property (the "Subject 
Property"). 
5. The 1986 condemnation was a complete and separate 
action from the 1975 condemnation. 
6. With respect to • the—1986—condemnation—and the 
Federal and State Relocation Acts, the County failed to act 
expeditiously to acquire the Subject Property by negotiation. 
7. With respect to the provisions of the Federal and 
State Relocation Acts, the County failed to notify Ferrebee that 
it was having the Subject Property appraised, and failed to give 
Ferrebee or his representatives an opportunity to accompany the 
County's appraisers during their inspection of the Subject 
Property. 
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8. With respect to the provisions of the Federal and 
State Relocation Acts, the County failed to offer to Ferrebee the 
lowest appraisal amount for purchase of the property. 
9. With respect to the provisions of the Federal and 
State Relocation Acts, the County failed to make a full 
disclosure to Ferrebee of information which was the basis for the 
amount used by the County in negotiations with Ferrebee. 
10. The comparable sales used by the County's 
appraisers, and particularly the Terracor sales, were not compe-
tent adjusted comparables. 
11. The Terracor sales used by the County's appraisers 
involved depressed sales arising out of circumstances under which 
Terracor was trying to get rid of its land by dumping a large 
amount of land on the market. Consequently, the transactions 
constituting the Terracor sales are not competent comparable 
sales. 
12. The appraisal of Phil Cook, Ferrebee's appraiser, 
is the best estimate of the fair market value of the Subject 
Property, and is adopted by the Court as the true market value of 
the Subject Property. 
13. As set forth in the Cook appraisal, the agricul-
tural value of the Subject Property was $52,000 on May 16, 1986. 
14. Ferrebee had a verbal option with Floyd Walters to 
acquire access to the Subject Property for $500 per acre. 
15. Ferrebee entered into a written option to acquire 
access to the Subject Property at a stated value of $5,000 per 
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acre. The Court finds that this $5,000 per acre value for access 
to the Subject Property was binding on Ferrebee and, based upon 
such value, adopts a total cost to acquire access of $19,240. 
16. As indicated in the Cook appraisal, the fair market 
value of the property is enhanced by its proximity to the initial 
construction of the airport. 
17. As set forth in the Cook appraisal, the fair market 
value of the property is the base agricultural value of the land 
($52,000), less the cost of access (determined by the Court to be 
$19,240), plus an enhancement of $40,950 or 125 percent of the 
adjusted agricultural base value for the property's proximity to 
the airport, based upon competent comparable sales of land adja-
cent to other rural airports, for a total fair market value of 
$74,000. 
18. Ferrebee paid taxes on the Subject Property in the 
amount of $826.31 after the County took possession of the Subject 
Property. 
19. The County deposited with the Court the sum of 
$9,004.87 at about the time of condemnation. 
20. Ferrebee expended reasonable and necessary costs in 
this action in the amount of $307.32. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code Sec. 
57-12-1, et. seq. does not apply to this case. 
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2. The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land 
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4601, et. seq. 
does not apply to this case. 
3. Ferrebee is entitled to be paid the fair market 
value of the Subject Property, as discounted by the cost of 
access and as enhanced by its proximity to the airport. The fair 
market value thus calculated is $74,000. 
4. Ferrebee is entitled to a refund of taxes paid on 
the Subject Property after the County took possession in the 
amount of $826.31. 
5. Ferrebee is entitled to his reasonable and 
necessary costs in the amount of $307.32. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 78-34-9, Ferrebee is 
entitled to interest on the sum of $64,995.13 at the rate of 8 
percent per annum from May 16, 1986 to the date of entry of 
Judgment. 
7. Ferrebee is entitled to interest at the rate of 12 
percent per annum on the total amount of Judgment from the date 
of entry of Judgment thereafter. 
DATED this £ & day of April, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
lomer F. Wilkinson 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered 
this \l- day of April, 1990, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to: 
David B. Thomas 
STOKER & THOMAS 
311 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt-Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for PLAINTIFF 
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Evan A. Schmutz (#3860) 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS : 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, : 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT 
:
 ./ - ) / - _ / / 
vs. : U -<->-' 
/ •' 
JOSEPH WILEY FERREBEE, : Civil No. CV-86156 
Trustee of the Ferrebee : 
197 6 Family Trust, : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant- : 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, sitting without a jury, on July 11 
through July 14, 1989, and concluded on August 29, 1989- The 
plaintiff, Board of County Commissioners of Tooele County (the 
"County"), was represented by David B. Thomas; the defendant, 
Joseph Wiley Ferrebee ("Ferrebee"), was represented by Evan A. 
Schmutz and Robert A. Goodman. The Court, having heard the 
arguments of counsel, and having received the evidence, rendered 
its bench ruling at the conclusion of trial, on August 29, 1989, 
and following several hearings, entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on April 30, 1990. Being fully advised in the 
premises and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant 
Joseph Wiley Ferrebee shall have judgment against plaintiff Board 
of County Commissioners of Tooele County as follows: 
1. For the fair market value of the Subject Property in 
the amount of $74,000; 
2. For a refund of taxes paid on the Subject Property in 
the amount of $826.31; 
3. For necessary costs in the amount of $307.32; 
4. For interest on the sum of $64,995.13 at the rate of 8% 
per annum from May 16, 19 86 to the date of the entry of judgment, 
and at the rate of 12% from the date of judgment thereafter; 
5- For interest on the sum of $826.31 at the rate of 10% 
per annum from July 1, 1989 until the date of the entry of 
judgment and at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of 
judgment thereafter; 
6. Each party shall bear their own costs except as 
specifically provided for herein, and their own attorneys' fees. 
DATED this / ( day of June, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
-0^—f^Z^ . 
^Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
/District Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
STOKER & THOMAS 
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